Much in our interior mental lives and in our exterior social structures presupposes that we, human beings, are conscious of social hierarchy, of differences in rank and status. This book, first, offers a philosophical analysis of what social hierarchy is. Second, it suggests that we cannot make sense of many familiar ideas about society and politics, both in high theory and in ordinary discourse, without presupposing that there is a distinctive objection to being set beneath another in a social hierarchy—without presupposing that there is a value of “noninferiority.” It is not enough to appeal to the fair distribution of goods and the protection of natural rights, as many political philosophers do.What are these familiar ideas, which can only be fully explained by an objection to social hierarchy? They include:

• that there is a problem with the state’s “coercion” of those subject to it that requires the state to clear a special bar of “justification” or “legitimacy”;
• that there is a prohibition on “illiberal” interference, such as fines, in choices of certain kinds, such as religion;
• that public officials should not abuse their offices corruptly;
• that people are entitled to democratic structures of decision-making, which give each person, at some appropriate level, if not at all levels, an equal say;
• that there is an objection to discrimination on the basis, say, of gender or race;
• and that people have claims to enjoy the same liberty, opportunity, and treatment that others in one’s society enjoy.

As to how I would like a reader to read the book, it will help, first, to highlight its recurring, three-part structure. It begins with a familiar idea, like one of those listed above. It then observes, negatively, that the idea cannot be explained by appealing to the fair distribution of goods or the protection of natural rights. It then conjectures, positively, that the idea can be explained by appealing to the value of noninferiority, to an objection to being set beneath another in a social hierarchy. It then repeats with another familiar idea, and so on.Now, it is a very long book. I don’t advise a forward march through the whole thing at first—unless you have angelic patience or a thing for endurance events! The introduction suggests a first pass through the book, which gives the reader one instance of the three-part structure, along with a characterization of the value of noninferiority. With that in the rearview mirror, the reader can then make pit-stops at the topics that most interest them, such as, say, discrimination or democracy.However, I would hope that if the reader has doubts about the book’s main positive conjecture—namely, that noninferiority is a freestanding value, that there is an objection to social hierarchy that cannot be explained in other terms—that the reader then take the time to read through other instances of the three-part structure before rendering a final verdict. The case for the positive conjecture is ultimately cumulative.